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Abstract
Elizabeth Anscombe is well-known for her insistence that there are absolutely prohibited 
actions, though she is somewhat obscure about why this is so. Nonetheless, I contend in 
this paper that Anscombe is more concerned with the epistemology of absolute prohi-
bitions, and that her thought on connatural moral knowledge – which resembles moral 
intuition – is key to understanding her thought on moral prohibitions. I shall identify 
key features of Anscombe’s moral epistemology before turning to investigate its sources, 
examining the roots of connaturality in Aquinas and comparing it with rationalist ethical 
intuitionism, which Anscombe differs from in rejecting “good” as a simple, non-natural 
property. I then develop a two-stage argument about absolute prohibition: The first will be 
loosely Thomistic, while the second will suggest how Anscombe’s absolute prohibitions can 
be seen as a continuation of Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism in On Certainty. I develop an 
account of absolute prohibitions as a form of Wittgensteinian hinge proposition – they are 
not the conclusions of deductive arguments, but the foundations for intelligibility in action. 
Keywords: connatural knowledge; virtue ethics; “Modern Moral Philosophy”; ethical intu-
itionism; Aquinas; natural law; Tractatus; On Certainty; hinge propositions
Resum. L’epistemologia moral d’Anscombe i la rellevància de l’antiescepticisme de Wittgenstein
Elizabeth Anscombe és coneguda per la seva insistència que hi ha accions absolutament 
prohibides, tot i que no està molt segura de per què és així. No obstant això, sostinc en 
aquest article que Anscombe està més preocupada per l’epistemologia de les prohibicions 
absolutes, i que el seu pensament sobre el coneixement moral connatural, que s’assembla a 
la intuïció moral, és clau per comprendre el seu pensament sobre les prohibicions morals. 
Identificaré les característiques clau de l’epistemologia moral d’Anscombe abans de passar 
a investigar-ne les fonts, examinar les arrels de la connaturalitat en Tomàs d’Aquino i 
comparar-la amb l’intuïcionisme eticoracionalista, del qual Anscombe difereix en rebut-
jar el «bé» com una propietat simple, no natural. Després desenvolupo un argument de 
dues etapes sobre la prohibició absoluta: el primer serà poc tomista, mentre que el segon 
suggerirà que les prohibicions absolutes d’Anscombe poden veure’s com una continuació 
de l’antiescepticisme de Wittgenstein a On Certainty. Desenvolupo una explicació de les 
prohibicions absolutes com una forma de la proposta de la frontissa de Wittgenstein: no 
són les conclusions dels arguments deductius, sinó els fonaments de la intel·ligibilitat en 
l’acció.
Paraules clau: coneixement connatural; ètica de la virtut; “Modern Moral Philosophy”; 
intuï cionisme ètic; Tomàs d’Aquino; llei natural; Tractatus; On Certainty; proposta frontissa
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1. Introduction
Elizabeth Anscombe’s reputation in moral philosophy is associated with two 
qualities in particular: An insistence on the existence of absolutely prohibited 
actions and an encouragement – to put it mildly – of an ethic based on virtue 
rather than obligation. These two themes are given prominence in her paper 
“Modern Moral Philosophy”, but, somewhat frustratingly, are never really 
developed beyond their philosophically embryonic form. In the decades fol-
lowing the publication of that paper in 1958, much more philosophical atten-
tion has been paid to the subject of virtue, and there is no denying that of the 
two, Anscombe’s thought on absolute prohibitions is the more idiosyncratic in 
presentation, even in her subsequent writings. But it ought not to be neglected, 
not least because it drives so many of her concerns in moral philosophy. 
Indeed, no reading of “Modern Moral Philosophy” can be complete with-
out a consideration of absolute prohibitions. Hence, it is there that I shall 
situate the underlying thesis of this paper, which is that Anscombe is more 
concerned with the epistemological side of the most basic moral prohibitions, 
and that this in turn lends itself to a Wittgensteinian reading. The purpose of 
this paper is hence partly exegetical: I will proceed by identifying the key 
features of Anscombe’s moral epistemology before turning to investigating its 
sources, in order to develop a two-stage argument about absolute prohibitions. 
The first stage is loosely Thomistic and naturalistic, and the second – which 
will be more speculative than exegetical – will attempt to suggest how Ans-
combe’s thought on prohibited actions can be seen as a continuation of Witt-
genstein’s anti-sceptical arguments, most notably in his posthumous work On 
Certainty. I shall suggest that we can think of some of the most deep-seated 
moral intuitions we have as Wittgensteinian hinge propositions, on which the 
rest of moral knowledge turns.
2. “Modern Moral Philosophy” and absolute prohibitions
In “Modern Moral Philosophy” Anscombe contends that contemporary the-
ories of ethics are so unprofitable that we should consider “banishing ethics 
totally from our minds” until we are able to investigate the concept of “virtue” 
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properly, which offers us a more promising path for understanding right and 
wrong. Yet at the same time Anscombe makes it clear that she is “not able to 
do the philosophy involved”, nor is anyone else, she claims, “in the present 
situation of English philosophy” (1958a: 15-16). If we are to take her quite 
literally, this clearly leaves us in an unsatisfactory position. As for absolute 
prohibitions, Anscombe seems to veer towards the level of ad hominem when 
she writes:
But if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether 
such an action as procuring the judicial execution of the innocent should be 
quite excluded from consideration – I do not want to argue with him; he 
shows a corrupt mind. (ibid.: 17) 
Perhaps it is due to this double-obscurity that some have been tempted to 
adopt a more sceptical reading of “Modern Moral Philosophy”. Such a reading 
would view Anscombe as being doubtful of the possibility of ever developing 
a fully-fledged account of virtue ethics, and would therefore take the paper to 
be suggesting, in effect, that the only hope for ethics to ground any sort of 
absolute prohibition is through some notion of a divine law and lawgiver 
(Driver, 2018; see also Blackburn, 2005). Anscombe’s own staunch Roman 
Catholic faith, which clearly animates her subsequent engagement with moral 
questions such as euthanasia and contraception, would seem on the face of it 
to confirm this thesis. 
All this, I fear, is somewhat misleading, for Anscombe is being nothing 
other than realistic about the philosophical difficulties involved in the direc-
tions she sets out for future travel. These include the need to develop “an 
account of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue 
is, and above all of ‘human flourishing.’” (Anscombe, 1958a: 18). But chal-
lenging as the task at hand may be, if one were to follow this route, then 
whatever one’s religious beliefs one might still come to some degree of knowl-
edge about ethics. The point, though, is that one has to ask the right kind of 
question – and this is a central contention of “Modern Moral Philosophy”. If 
one did not believe in divine law, then it is more profitable to ask questions 
of virtue and vice, like “Is this just?” or “Is this gluttonous?”, rather than “Is 
this morally right?” (Geach, 2005). The latter sort of question aroused Ans-
combe’s hostility because it seemed to treat the word “moral” as conferring 
some special force to its accompanying injunctions, or else as denoting a 
particular sub-class of actions that alone were the province of moral inquiry 
(Anscombe, 2005c: 204). 
Where do absolute prohibitions fit in? The considerations above are useful 
for situating our discussion because Anscombe does not treat the question of 
absolute prohibitions as wholly separate from the challenges enumerated above 
for understanding virtue. She would certainly be strenuously opposed to the 
popular misconception, very much alive even today, that virtue ethics represents 
a kind of “mushy middle” position between consequentialism and deontology, 
one that does not generally admit of absolute rules about certain actions. 
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Virtue ethics is not infrequently presented as differing from consequential-
ism and deontology in asking as its primary question, not whether an act is 
right or wrong, but what sort of character one ought to act or live by. If such 
an explanation is not wildly inaccurate, it is at best a partial truth. As John 
Haldane contends in this regard, the idea that “the good of actions and that 
of outcomes are nothing but a reflection of goodness of heart or intellect or 
will” sounds implausible or even incoherent (2011: 381). An excessively 
agent-centred view which really replaces “virtue”, properly understood, with 
“motive” could excuse just about anything.
Such a desiccated form of virtue ethics hardly resembles what Anscombe 
means by asking questions such as “Is this just?”. In fact, one might think that 
what Anscombe says about justice or other virtues has very little to do with 
“character” as we understand the word in ordinary language. She says, for 
instance, that an act such as “bilking” is contrary to the virtue of justice “in a 
merely ‘factual’ way”; bilking is bad for humans just as it is bad for machinery 
to run without oil (1958a: 4-5). She accepts that the evaluation of some 
actions from the perspective of virtue will depend on circumstance and inten-
tion, but there will be other actions that are intrinsically incompatible, for 
example, with the virtue of justice and hence are always excluded (ibid.: 15). 
Anscombe’s paradigm example in this respect, as we have already seen in her 
“corrupt mind” remark, is “procuring the judicial execution of the innocent”. 
But here we immediately run into a difficulty: Anscombe appears to simply 
assume the intrinsic unjustness of such an action, at least as far as “Modern 
Moral Philosophy” goes. Or else, for all her talk of jettisoning a divine law 
conception of ethics for the purposes of philosophy, she is really relying on 
Roman Catholic doctrine here to push her point. After all, she is not exactly 
averse, elsewhere, to speaking of ethics in terms of the natural law, properly 
understood as a form of divine legislation (2008: 179). 
The role of the natural law in Anscombe’s view on absolute prohibitions 
is one we will return to later, but for now what must be said is that the sug-
gestion that a “covert divine law theory” is at work here overlooks an impor-
tant feature of the natural law, which as an ethical theory makes two distinct 
claims – one concerning ontology, and the other epistemology. Regarding 
ontology, natural law in the tradition of Thomas Aquinas is undeniably the-
istic. Aquinas himself could not be clearer about this. The natural law, he 
writes, is “nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal 
law” of God (ST, I-II, q. 91, a. 2, co.).1 But the epistemological claim of the 
natural law is that one does not, in principle, require religious belief to know 
its precepts. Hence Anscombe writes in “Contraception and Chastity”:
“Natural law” is simply a way of speaking about the whole of morality, used by 
Catholic thinkers because they believe the general precepts of morality are laws 
promulgated by God our Creator in the enlightened human understanding 
1. All references to Aquinas’s Summa Theologica are taken from Aquinas (1920) and will be 
cited as “ST” in the text.
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when it is thinking in general terms about what are good and what are bad 
actions. That is to say, the discoveries of reflection and reasoning when we 
think straight about these things are God’s legislation to us (whether we realise 
this or not). (2008: 179)
Anscombe is on the whole more concerned with the epistemology than 
the ontology of the natural law, and that is indeed why I will be focusing on the 
epistemology of absolute prohibitions in this paper. Seen from this perspective, 
any “covert” reliance on a divine legislator would not therefore conflict with 
Anscombe’s thesis in “Modern Moral Philosophy” about virtue being the most 
promising route for doing ethics. It helps to think of ethics as being, in a way, 
more like the natural sciences than theology. For example, one who believes 
in God as creator would hold that anyone examining and reasoning about the 
natural world, whether they know it or not, is studying God’s creation. God’s 
revelation may give an additional dimension to one’s study, or provide an 
independent reason for favouring a particular scientific hypothesis (say, the 
Big Bang as opposed to Steady State theory), but this does not mean that 
science cannot make progress by its own non-theological tools and standards. 
This, I think, is an apt analogy with ethics from a natural law standpoint. 
That is all well and good, but it does not explain Anscombe’s apparent 
question-begging in relation to the wrongness of killing the innocent. Fur-
thermore, her “corrupt mind” remark might be taken as suggesting that moral 
knowledge of this sort is owed to the possession of a certain refined, or at least 
unadulterated, moral sensibility. Is that true? Why exactly is killing the inno-
cent intrinsically wrong? 
Here again Anscombe’s advice about asking the right kind of question is 
important. It is easy to ask “Why?” of any statement of moral belief, or indeed 
of any belief – and the sceptical tradition in philosophy is long if not venera-
ble – but the sceptic might himself be asked, “What kind of answer are you 
looking for? Are you looking for a rational requirement, for instance?” When 
a putative prohibition such as that against the intentional killing of the inno-
cent is “so basic” that it is hard to explain why it is so (Anscombe, 2005d: 
266), might it be rather that the question “Why?” has no application – or at 
any rate cannot be meaningfully posed?
What I should like to suggest is that Anscombe shies away from “Why?” 
questions about absolute prohibitions because they are, without further qual-
ification at least, the wrong kind of question to ask. But to get there, I shall 
first investigate Anscombe’s treatment of our knowledge of such prohibitions, 
which – “corrupt minds” notwithstanding – appears to have the character of 
commonly-shared intuitions. This, however, should not be confused with the 
rationalist ethical intuitionism associated with G.E. Moore. Anscombe instead 
uses the term “connatural knowledge”, a term which comes from Aquinas and 
which, while being at the centre of Anscombe’s epistemology of moral prohi-
bitions, requires much clarification.
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3. Connatural knowledge in Anscombe: “as common as humanity”?
Having situated our discussion of absolute prohibitions in Anscombe’s thought 
on virtue, we can see her account of the relationship between both concepts 
raises the following question: In relation to justice, do we come to know of the 
intrinsic unjustness of certain actions having reflected on the nature of justice, 
or is it through such paradigm cases as killing the innocent that we learn of 
the virtue of justice – and indeed what is at its core? Provisionally, I would 
suggest that Anscombe would side with the latter explanation, on account of 
her understanding of connatural knowledge.
A major theme running through Anscombe’s moral philosophy is her con-
tention that certain basic moral prohibitions or values are known to us almost 
instinctively. Such knowledge is called connatural knowledge, which, as its 
etymology might suggest, is that which is “readily known” on account of one’s 
nature (Anscombe, 2005a: 60). In some ways such a concept resembles ethical 
intuitionism, though its roots in Thomistic philosophy ultimately suggest cer-
tain key differences – chiefly to do with the object of such moral knowledge. 
Anscombe addresses the subject of connatural knowledge most clearly and 
directly in a paper entitled “Knowledge and Reverence for Human Life”, where 
she makes three claims of particular relevance to our discussion. Firstly, con-
natural knowledge is not concerned exclusively with ethics; it also includes 
forms of knowledge as basic as the knowledge of material substances. Such 
knowledge can be considered “connatural” because of an affinity in nature 
between ourselves, as material beings, and such substances. 
Secondly, where it concerns ethics, connatural knowledge is a “capacity to 
recognise what action will accord with and what ones will be contrary to” a 
certain virtue. With actions contrary to virtue in particular, connatural knowl-
edge involves a kind of inclination against an action, a ready “perception” of 
its immorality, which Anscombe compares to the “revulsion which is some-
times part of the perception of something as disgusting, as, for example, if 
someone were to spit into one’s glass” (ibid.: 60). However, there is no reason 
to suppose that Anscombe has only absolute prohibitions in mind here (if she 
even does at all); one who is well formed in a particular virtue might also 
recognise connaturally a wide variety of actions contrary to that virtue in 
particular circumstances. That being said, Anscombe stresses that connatural 
knowledge is insufficient for virtue. One needs “not only a connatural ‘pro’ or 
‘anti’ reaction” but also knowledge of the specifics of one’s given situation and 
practical wisdom in order to act virtuously (ibid.: 63). 
Thirdly, Anscombe claims that the most important instance of connatural 
knowledge is the knowledge of the dignity of a human being, which is essen-
tial to possessing the virtue of justice (ibid.: 61-63; see also Anscombe, 2005b). 
This, presumably, is what is involved in knowing the intrinsic unjustness of 
intentionally killing the innocent – Anscombe’s absolute prohibition par excel-
lence – though it is also at the heart of the just person’s response to someone 
who is hungry or cold, a response which nonetheless is not governed by the 
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same sort of absolute rule. To restate the point made above, one requires prac-
tical wisdom to work out what exactly is to be done in the particular situation 
(Anscombe, 2005a: 64-65).
These claims alone do not suffice for establishing, at least on Anscombe’s 
view, that the absolute prohibition against intentionally killing the innocent 
is known connaturally and prior to acquiring the virtue of justice, and hence 
our question at the outset of this section remains unanswered as yet. 
Anscombe herself recognises a problem of circularity with regard to con-
natural moral knowledge – that one needs the virtue of justice to have its 
relevant connatural inclinations, but that one also needs certain inclinations 
to possess such virtue in the first place. Her response to this problem of cir-
cularity is a classic Aristotelian one: Moral education. Getting into the habit 
of performing just actions makes a person “inclined to do them qua just. This 
is already inchoate virtue and makes him have good inclinations, i.e. inclina-
tions to the ends that a just man has” (ibid.: 63-64). This may well be a prac-
tical solution to the problem of circularity, but it does not address the theo-
retical question of whether the virtue of justice is discovered, so to speak, by 
intuitive knowledge of certain prohibitions. 
Does Anscombe provide us with other resources with which to address this 
problem? Here it is worth remarking that elsewhere Anscombe seems to refer 
to a similar phenomenon of intuitive moral knowledge, perhaps somewhat 
unhelpfully, as a “mystical perception” – a choice of term she immediately 
qualifies:
I don’t mean, in calling it a mystical perception, that it’s out of the ordinary. 
It’s as ordinary as the feeling for the respect due to a man’s dead body: the 
knowledge that a dead body isn’t something to be put out for the collectors of 
refuse to pick up. This, too, is mystical; though it’s as common as humanity. 
(2008: 187)
Nevertheless, the term “mystical” in context serves a rhetorical function of 
being contrasted with mere utilitarian value – indeed Anscombe wants to 
define “mystical” as “supra-utilitarian”, and she considers the absolute prohi-
bition on murder as falling under this category as well (ibid.). Perhaps more 
curiously than any of the examples already given, Anscombe also speaks of the 
value of participation in democratic decision-making as being “mystical”, 
along with the perception of having been part of the “we” that made a decision 
even though one personally voted for the losing side (1976: 162-163).2 
One might reasonably hypothesise, therefore, that “mystical” perceptions 
are a particular kind of connatural knowledge – the kind concerned with 
things which have value in and of themselves, and not merely instrumental 
value. This will, unsurprisingly, involve absolute prohibitions at times, though 
not always – I do not think that Anscombe meant to say that there was an 
2. Mary Geach provides a helpful discussion on Anscombe’s use of “mystical” in her paper 
“Anscombe on Sexual Ethics” (2016: 231-232).
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absolute prohibition involved in safeguarding democratic rights to vote, even 
if we can recognise its supra-utilitarian value. 
In any case, looking back again at “Modern Moral Philosophy”, where Ans-
combe seems to take for granted that killing the innocent is always wrong 
– specifically in contrast with utilitarian or consequentialist moral philoso-
phy – we are now in a better position to see this as a point involving connat-
ural knowledge, indeed of the “mystical” kind. This would offer a far more 
satisfactory response to the question of circularity, if certain absolute prohibi-
tions are known connaturally before the acquisition of virtue by habituation. 
The philosophical “cost” of that position would, I suppose, be to accept that 
everyone therefore already possesses the virtue of justice, for example, albeit 
in its most inchoate form possible. But I see no reason why this would be 
inconsistent with Anscombe’s moral philosophy. To be sure, that a certain 
piece of knowledge or perception is “as common as humanity” does not imply 
that every single person must possess it. One might make room for “corrupt 
minds” who do not.
4. A brief note from the Thomistic tradition
All that being said, some loose ends regarding connatural knowledge need to 
be tied up to make progress with our investigation into absolute prohibitions. 
No doubt, interpretative difficulties regarding connatural knowledge are not 
unique to Anscombe – the subject is a controversial one even in Aquinas 
himself, who does not give a systematic account of connaturality (Suto, 2004: 
65), and among scholars of Aquinas’s thought (Lisska, 1996: 28, 228). 
Among Thomists, the philosopher most associated with the concept of 
connatural knowledge is arguably Jacques Maritain,3 who describes it as “a 
kind of knowledge which is produced in the intellect but not by virtue of 
conceptual connections and by way of demonstration,” (2001: 13) but rather 
“through inclination, by looking at and consulting what we are and the inner 
bents or propensities of our own being”. The intellect, Maritain writes, “is at 
play not alone, but together with affective inclinations and the dispositions of 
the will, and is guided and directed by them” (ibid.: 15). These “dispositions 
of the will” surely refer to the virtues, and this therefore echoes Aquinas’s own 
use of “connatural”, which is to refer to someone who, possessing a particular 
virtue, “judges rightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination 
towards it” – inclination here being contrasted with intellectual knowledge 
(ST, I, q. 1, a. 6, ad. 3).
However, as Taki Suto points out (2004: 68), Aquinas really has two dis-
tinct uses of the term “connatural”. Its primary meaning, in fact, refers to 
natural inclinations prior to the inculcation of virtue; its secondary meaning 
concerns the inclinations to the good developed by the virtues subsequently 
3. I am not aware, however, of any engagement that Anscombe may have had with Maritain’s 
thought.
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acquired in life through habituation. Both are natural, so to speak, but Suto 
here points to a classic Thomistic distinction between “first nature” and “sec-
ond nature” – the former being what we have at birth and the latter what we 
develop based on the former. 
In the light of this, we can restate our thesis about Anscombe’s view of abso-
lute prohibitions with some more precision. Our intuitive grasp of at least some 
of these prohibitions – as well as the most fundamental “mystical” values – 
would be connatural knowledge in the primary sense, and reveals to us the 
core of the relevant virtues. But as one grows in virtue, one may also acquire 
a connatural grasp of how to act in accordance with those virtues even in 
matters which do not admit of absolute rules or prohibitions. Connaturality, 
after all, is the product of “affective inclinations and the dispositions of the 
will”, which are the subject of virtue and its acquisition. One learns to become 
disposed, particularly through the ordering of one’s emotions, towards certain 
actions or goods and one becomes more habituated to the practice of the 
virtues in a reasonable range of situations. That is Aristotelian virtue in a 
nutshell. While practical wisdom is still indispensable to the virtuous person, 
since the circumstances of life are so variable, the possession of the virtue of 
justice in its full-fledged form may mean that someone will already know 
connaturally what to do and what not to do in the usual circumstances that 
he encounters a cold or hungry person on the streets. 
Suto, helpfully, gives the example of saving a drowning child – deliberation 
may prove too slow to make a meaningful difference, but thanks to connatural 
knowledge the virtuous person can act according to the demands of the situa-
tion and of virtue “without hesitation, immediately, reliably, and even with 
pleasure” (ibid.: 75). This almost certainly involves an interplay of both kinds 
of connatural knowledge – the visceral pull of a life hanging in the balance 
before one’s eyes is surely connatural in the primary sense, though the readiness 
to jump into cold water is connatural in the secondary sense, if one has been 
habituated to such action whether interiorly or exteriorly.4 In this way, virtue 
can be seen to be built on the most basic prohibitions and connatural percep-
tions of value, while also requiring moral education.
5. A naturalistic account of absolute prohibitions
It should be clear by now why, as I have been hinting, Anscombe’s conception 
of connatural moral knowledge differs fundamentally from standard accounts of 
rationalist ethical intuitionism. Given what Anscombe says about unjustness 
potentially being seen as a “factual” description of sorts, which is in turn con-
4. Pinckaers (1962: 72-75) writes that it is not always feasible to acquire virtue by exterior 
action – one does not gain fortitude necessarily by always placing oneself in situations of 
danger. Hence, “interior acts of mastery” over fear or other undesirable tendencies are 
essential for habituation.
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nected to what it means to flourish as a human being, Anscombe would cer-
tainly not have shared the metaphysical commitments of intuitionists like 
G. E. Moore who thought of “good” as a “simple, unanalyzable property” 
(MacIntyre, 2002: 242). Such non-natural properties are, famously, the object 
of J. L. Mackie’s scorn in his argument from queerness, which considers their 
existence too wildly implausible and “so utterly different from anything else 
in the universe” to be true (Mackie, 1977: 38). 
Consider also how an earlier intuitionist, Richard Price, writes that it is:
palpably absurd… to ask, whether it is right to obey a command, or wrong to 
disobey it; and the propositions, obeying a command is right, or producing 
happiness is right, would be most trifling, as expressing no more than that 
obeying a command, is obeying a command, or producing happiness, is pro-
ducing happiness. (Stratton-Lake, 2013: 349)
For Anscombe, it would be a mistake to treat such statements as analytic 
truths – that would be a neglect of human flourishing – or as expressing some 
kind of non-natural property of “good”. “Good” is simply the evaluation of 
human action qua human action (Anscombe, 2005c). Furthermore, the con-
cept of connaturality would seem to stipulate that connatural knowledge of 
what is good is possible only because it belongs to someone’s nature to be 
inclined in a particular way – this applies even to the secondary sense of con-
naturality, since virtue is not an artificial disposition but one that coheres with 
a being’s first nature and brings it to fulfilment.
Yet it is true that where epistemology is concerned, there are apparent 
similarities to be found between connatural knowledge and rationalist ethical 
intuitionism. This is especially so when contrasted with sentimentalists like 
David Hume, who thought of right and wrong as akin to secondary qualities 
– that is to say, not residing in actions or objects themselves but referring 
primarily to the feelings of approbation or disapprobation caused in us. Price 
saw right and wrong, rather, as properties of actions which are apprehended 
immediately and self-evidently, much as we apprehend other simple ideas such 
as substance, space or time (Stratton-Lake, 2013: 344-346). Mackie, in fact, 
saw this as a fairly significant challenge to the argument from queerness 
(Mackie, 1977: 39), and one might note its resemblance to Anscombe’s claim 
that connatural knowledge includes our knowledge of matter. 
I do not think Anscombe would want to speak of connatural knowledge 
as apprehending “properties” of actions, but does she share intuitionist epis-
temological commitments to immediate and self-evident perception of right-
ness or wrongness? Is that not what is happening with mystical perceptions 
and connatural knowledge in the primary sense? I will return to address this 
question more directly in the next section, for in order to answer it, the first 
step is to ask whether we can now attempt to articulate a naturalistic account 
of absolute prohibitions – on the basis of Anscombean connatural knowledge 
and taking into account the relationship between absolute prohibitions and 
virtue. 
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For this task, we must, I think, use the primary sense of connatural knowl-
edge here, and in that respect the most significant passage in Aquinas is the 
following excerpt from his treatise on the natural law – an excerpt which, 
despite the absence of the word “connatural”, clearly accords with its meaning 
in its reference to natural inclinations: 
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a 
contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclina-
tion, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently 
as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. 
Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the 
precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination 
to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all sub-
stances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, 
according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means 
of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the nat-
ural law. (ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 2, co.)
The inclination to preserve life is shared by all living things; the passage then 
moves on to the inclinations pertaining to sexual intercourse and the education 
of offspring – which we share with animals – and finally the inclinations to 
know the truth about God and to live in society, unique to us as rational 
animals. But for our present purposes it is the first inclination, regarding life, 
that will concern us the most.
Understanding connatural knowledge in relation to these basic inclinations 
helps us better interpret a particular feature of Anscombe’s description of the 
absolute prohibition on killing the innocent. This is her insistence that when 
it comes to killing the innocent, “the victim is the primary one to be wronged, 
and this is enough objection to murder in most cases” (Anscombe, 2005d: 
266). For Anscombe, this point is especially what separates her view from 
utilitarian philosophy. Again, asking the right kind of question is of central 
importance here. Anscombe suggests that it is “exceedingly comic” to think 
that the prohibition on murder is fundamentally about making life “more 
commodious” – that “life is pleasanter for all of us” were everyone to observe 
the prohibition:
Because utility presupposes the life of those who are to be convenienced, 
and everybody perceives quite clearly that the wrong done in murder is done 
first and foremost to the victim, whose life is not inconvenienced, it just 
isn’t there any more. He isn’t there to complain: so the utilitarian argument 
has to be on behalf of the rest of us. Therefore, though true, it is highly 
comic and is not the foundation: the objection to murder is supra-utilitar-
ian. (2008: 187)
This is one of the most striking passages in Anscombe’s moral philosophy; 
it is one of the most earnest attempts to get to the bottom of a prohibition 
that is, by Anscombe’s own admission, difficult to explain. What exactly is the 
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basis of perceiving that “the wrong done in murder is done first and foremost 
to the victim” despite the victim no longer existing afterwards (beliefs in the 
afterlife notwithstanding)?5 
Given Anscombe’s debt to Aquinas in her philosophy and in particular her 
account of connatural knowledge, it seems reasonable to suggest that one way 
of interpreting this passage is to say, first of all, that we do not fundamentally 
grasp the wrongness of murder by any kind of deductive or inferential reason-
ing. We do not, for example, imagine what it would be like to sit behind a veil 
of ignorance and think up what rules would be necessary for society to func-
tion well – without denying that if we did, we would most likely think of 
prohibiting murder. 
The almost immediate perception of the wrongness of killing another per-
son, rather, is the result of that most basic natural inclination towards the 
preservation of life that we feel within ourselves and which makes the thought 
of one’s own suicide so psychologically intolerable at first glance for most 
people, in the absence of complicating factors. Our capacity for empathy, 
which can produce perceptions of a rather direct kind – and such knowledge 
of another’s perspective is arguably a kind of connatural knowledge as well – is 
perhaps what helps us make that leap towards seeing that murder extinguish-
es another “me”, as it were. In knowing what one loses oneself by suicide, one 
knows what another thereby loses by being murdered. One perceives, in a 
mystical way, that there is something deeply wrong about this action. 
So the wrongness of murder is not the conclusion of an argument; it is a 
basic mode of seeing the world. And what is more basic than taking what one 
is attracted to as good and something to be sought? This, in essence, is also 
the founding claim of utilitarianism, though perhaps when Anscombe famous-
ly laments the shallowness of utilitarianism in “Modern Moral Philosophy” 
(1958a: 12), part of what she has in mind is that it does not really go beyond 
the thought that pleasure and pain are constitutive of good and evil. The 
distinction between higher and lower pleasures, or the move from act-to 
rule-utilitarianism, does not disguise this fact. 
Connatural knowledge in Anscombe’s (and Aquinas’s) worldview, by con-
trast, is about taking our most elementary attractions – and things contrary 
to them – as signs of good and evil, not good and evil itself. Beyond those 
basic inclinations, more work needs to be done, and that is where virtue comes 
in. Those inclinations point to what is good, and may reveal to us their oppo-
sitions – actions that directly contradict them and which are absolutely exclud-
ed. But in between these two poles is a whole range of actions whose alignment 
with virtue will depend on, as we said earlier, circumstance and intention. In 
between the inclination towards continued preservation of life and the prohi-
bition of murder are questions, for example, of whether one is obliged to do 
everything at all cost to preserve life – one’s own and others – and answering 
these questions requires virtue. 
5. One might say that this is an inverted non-identity problem.
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Nevertheless, these thoughts do not necessarily suggest that the perception 
of the wrongness of murder is “justified” in the way epistemologists would 
generally use the term, even if they do go some way in explaining how one 
perceives such a thing. What their justification might depend on, where Ans-
combe’s account of virtue is concerned, would be evidence of the alignment 
between our connatural inclinations to perceived goods and the goods of 
human flourishing. Precisely what kind of evidence might be admitted for 
such an inquiry is, indeed, a difficult question to answer. I shall call this the 
“justified belief objection”, though it may well be called the “verifiability objec-
tion” if one were a logical positivist, for one is reminded here of A.J. Ayer’s 
criticism of ethical intuitionism – that there is “no relevant empirical test” in 
the appeal to moral intuitions (Ayer, 1952: 139). 
A further question one might pose, which I shall term the “differentiation 
objection”, is how we might differentiate the supposedly genuine basic incli-
nations of our first nature from all other kinds of inclinations and attractions 
we experience, to which Anscombe would surely not give the same kind of 
weight. No doubt the inclination concerning the preservation of life has a 
particular existential gravity attached to it, but once we proceed to other incli-
nations in the realm of, say, food and sexual intercourse it is less obvious by 
what criteria one is meant to distinguish between different kinds of inclina-
tions – between the weightier or more “mystical” ones and those that only 
concern utilitarian value.
These challenges present obvious difficulties for us, even as connatural 
knowledge may present a plausible psychology for certain basic prohibitions 
like that of murder. But it seems that to overcome these objections we may 
have to hold these thoughts where they are and approach the epistemology of 
absolute prohibitions in a different key – a Wittgensteinian one.
6. Wittgensteinian anti-scepticism and the possibility of ethics
To respond adequately to the “justified belief objection” would require lengthy 
discussion of teleology, which is beyond the scope of this paper. But in what 
remains I shall try to suggest one way of averting (if not exactly refuting) the 
“differentiation objection” – and that is by adopting a more Wittgensteinian 
reading of connatural knowledge. 
Part of the problem with the account we have developed thus far is that we 
have taken connatural knowledge in overly mentalistic terms. Anscombe her-
self, as mentioned, does seem to accord connatural knowledge the character 
of an intuition or perception, and this is, I think, true to an extent. But 
returning to the question of how similar it is to intuitionist epistemology, even 
if connatural knowledge is a kind of immediate intuition, whether it produc-
es self-evident moral judgements is questionable. In relation to murder, just as 
Anscombe wants to say we clearly see it is wrong because the victim is wronged 
by being killed, she also recognises that there might be exceptions like killing 
enemy combatants in a just war (2005d: 266-267). So although we have thus 
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far been speaking of the connatural knowledge of the wrongness of killing the 
innocent, there is an unexplained gap between the ready perception that there 
is something wrong with killing someone in general and the conviction that 
it is killing the innocent that is precisely what is absolutely prohibited, but 
those who do not fall under that category – however defined – do not neces-
sarily fall under that prohibition.
 This is where I think it is fruitful to see Anscombe’s account of absolute 
prohibitions in the light of Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism. While there is room 
for preserving the intuitive aspect of connatural knowledge, the concept can 
also expanded to include knowledge that is gained from a kind of practical 
certainty.6 Mystical perceptions, as Anscombe seems to suggest, point us 
towards something of great, supra-utilitarian value; but to turn that intuition 
into knowledge of an absolute prohibition may involve more than just a kind 
of perceiving. Our connatural intuitions therefore need further refinement or 
specification by our knowledge of human activity – patterns of acting and 
forms of life – although by “knowledge” I do not mean the product of exten-
sive reflection and deduction. I simply mean knowledge from our embedded-
ness in human communities. From our forms of life, we already have, for 
example, some knowledge of what “innocence” might mean in relation to not 
killing the innocent. In this way, with both intuition and practical certainty 
we come to a clearer, but still truly connatural knowledge of particular prohi-
bitions, and this is all still prior to the acquisition of virtue by habituation. 
This sense of practical certainty is one that comes from Wittgenstein’s 
anti-scepticism, to which we shall now turn. Recall once again the insight that 
when we reach something as basic as the wrongness of murder, so readily 
perceived by many people, the reason why the invidious “Why?” questions of 
the moral sceptic seem difficult to answer is because they do not perhaps ask 
a meaningful question. This thought is very much in line with Wittgenstein’s 
anti-scepticism, which is of great use to us precisely because, while the sceptic 
asks the realist for the grounds for his belief, Wittgenstein in turn asks the 
sceptic for his grounds for scepticism. A key idea in Wittgenstein’s early 
anti-scepticism is the following statement in the Tractatus: 
Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise 
doubts where no questions can be asked. 
For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an 
answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said. (Wittgenstein, 
2001: 6.51)
This thought is taken up again in some ways during Wittgenstein’s subse-
quent return to anti-sceptical arguments in On Certainty, in which he suggest-
ed that doubt needs grounds and must “amount to something” (Kenny, 2006: 
6. See Müller (1994) for a helpful discussion of the contrast between intuitionist ethics and 
practical certainty. 
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162). It is imaginable, Wittgenstein says, that “my skull should turn out empty 
when it was operated on” but grounds for doubt are lacking (1969: § 4). As 
to the latter point, Wittgenstein asks what difference the doubt makes “in 
practice” (Kenny, 2006: 162). If one doubted one’s bodily existence, preferring 
either Berkeley’s idealism or a brain-in-the-vat as an explanation for one’s 
sensations, does this make a difference to how one goes about acting? Perhaps 
not at all in the first case, and perhaps little discernible difference in the sec-
ond, practically speaking. 
The effect of Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism is, I think, to suggest that 
doubt is parasitic on belief. “Doubt comes after belief ” (Wittgenstein, 1969: 
§ 160). We have to begin by taking certain propositions for granted before we 
can even begin to doubt, let alone doubt intelligibly. Doubt, furthermore, 
“presupposes the mastery of a language-game. In order to express the doubt 
that p, one must understand what is meant by saying that p” (Kenny, 2006: 
162). If one really wants to doubt everything, as did Descartes, one should try 
doubting even the meaning of one’s words (Wittgenstein, 1969: § 114), in 
which case one’s doubt starts to appear far more nonsensical than the propo-
sitions it is doubting! 
Translating these insights into the sphere of ethics is not straightforward, 
nonetheless: How does one mean that the question “Why?” is not meaningful 
in response to a putative absolute prohibition? Is that not what all the thought 
experiments about utilitarianism – Jim and the Indians, or any other scenario 
contrived such that the intentional killing of one has disproportionately great-
er positive consequences – are for? 
We need to take a few steps back from the preceding discussion of Ans-
combe’s connatural knowledge and pose a yet more sceptical question than the 
“Why is murder wrong?”. Is it possible to not have ethics at all? More radical-
ly than disagreeing over what counts as good and what counts as evil, can we 
meaningfully doubt the proposition that “good is to be done and pursued, and 
evil is to be avoided”, which for Aquinas is the first principle of the natural law 
and is self-evident to the practical intellect just as the principle of non-contra-
diction is self-evident to the speculative intellect (ST, I-II, q. 94, a. 2, co.)? Do 
we even have any grounds to doubt this proposition? Such a doubt could only 
be parasitic on pre-existing belief in the proposition itself, I would suggest. 
Wittgenstein’s point about doubt presupposing language-games is not a 
simple matter of doubting words. Language-games, for Wittgenstein, arise 
from human practices (Wittgenstein, 2009: § 7-26); “the speaking of language 
is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (ibid.: § 23). How – not simply as a 
matter of logic but as a matter of a form of life – could we live in such a way 
that did not embody some sense of “good is to be done and pursued, and evil 
is to be avoided”? A global doubt of ethics is simply not possible, practically 
if not psychologically – or should we say, it would amount to nothing. It is 
impossible not to act, and impossible not to act according to the logic of right 
and wrong, because so long as one is acting intentionally then one is always 
acting according to an end. “There is no ethics,” someone says to me. “Well 
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then, how should I act?” Is there a possible language-game in which there is 
no ethics? It seems not. Learning a language is itself a “normative activity” 
(Proessel, 2005: 329-330); to learn a language and concepts is not merely to 
assign labels but to make evaluations. 
Before we get to absolute prohibitions, it is worth reflecting a little more 
on the matter of language-games. Let us return for a moment to Price’s intu-
itionism and the “trifling” nature of statements such as “obeying a command 
is right” or “producing happiness is right”. To simply consider these things 
right by definition, no doubt, is a kind of analytic sleight-of-hand, but if one 
were to reconsider this statement without the Moorean metaphysical baggage 
of intuitionism, there is perhaps an insight to be gained. 
A reading more congenial to Anscombe’s moral epistemology – and to 
Wittgensteinian thought – would be to consider concepts such as commands 
or producing happiness from the perspective of the “natural history of man” 
– to look at our “institutions, culture and society” in order to find out which 
activities, practices, behaviours, physiological and environmental factors such 
concepts are “interwoven” with (Wiseman, 2016: 60). In isolation from 
human institutions, the question of obeying a command is almost meaning-
less. But in context, one might say that the language-game of obeying com-
mands7 is constituted by practices and concepts such as legitimate authority, 
hierarchy, law, enforcement and duty. It does not make obeying a command 
right by definition, but it might suggest that obeying commands is a charac-
teristically human mode of living well. 
Anscombe’s point on bilking as contrary to justice in a “factual” way is also, 
I think, to be understood in this vein. It is not that “bilking is wrong” is an 
analytic truth. In the context of our institutions, we can transition from the 
merely factual “is” of someone carting potatoes to my house to the relatively 
less “brute” fact that so-and-so “supplied” me with potatoes (rather than just 
leaving them there) and the certainly normative fact (if that is not an oxymo-
ron) that I owe him money – and that I may be bilking. (Anscombe, 1958a: 
3-4, 1958b) If we can go from “is” to “owes” or “bilking”, as Anscombe sug-
gests, then we already have in our institutions – in our language-game – some-
thing that is contra justice or honesty. If doubt were to be introduced here as 
to the viciousness of bilking, we should like to ask whether this is permitted 
by the language-game. 
Whether, of course, owing someone money constitutes bilking is some-
thing that will depend on circumstance and motive. The same goes with 
whether disobeying a command counts as insubordination – perhaps the com-
mand was altogether unreasonable. So we are not quite at absolute prohibi-
tions or intrinsically unjust actions yet, though we are close. Putative absolute 
prohibitions – and let us focus just on killing the innocent here – are not 
indubitable in the way that “do good and avoid evil” might be, psychological-
7. Coincidentally, “Giving orders, and acting on them” is the first in a list of language-games 
Wittgenstein provides early on in the Philosophical Investigations (2009: § 23).
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ly or practically. But is there a case for considering them “hinge proposition” 
nonetheless?
In On Certainty, Wittgenstein introduces the notion of hinge propositions, 
as they have come to be called, in the following passage:
341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the 
fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges 
on which those turn. 
342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that 
certain things are in deed not doubted.
343. But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t investigate 
everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assump-
tion. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. (1969: § 341-343)
Wittgenstein has in mind, not simply the most basic, absolutely indubita-
ble propositions, but also beliefs like knowing my two hands are in front of 
me or that the world has not just come into existence. These too can be 
“exempt from doubt”. He also contends that there are some things about 
which one simply cannot be mistaken; if someone, for instance, doubts that 
all his calculations were uncertain and unreliable, Wittgenstein says that “per-
haps we would say he was crazy” (1969: § 217). I cannot help but recall once 
again Anscombe’s infamous assertion, “I do not want to argue with him; he 
shows a corrupt mind”, of one who thinks that it is open to question wheth-
er procuring the judicial execution of the innocent is always prohibited. 
Anscombe has a sense, I think, not simply that the wrongness of murder 
is connaturally grasped, but that it is also the kind of proposition – assump-
tion, if you like – without which the door cannot turn, to use Wittgenstein’s 
potent metaphor. If we are to have ethics at all – and this, as we have seen, is 
a human necessity – then we need hinge propositions in the form of absolute 
prohibitions. And this is a kind of practical certainty. Part of Anscombe’s 
distaste therefore for thought experiments that contrive to prove consequen-
tialism right is that they require one “to assume some sort of law or standard 
according to which there is a borderline case” (1958a: 13) for the experiment 
to even have intuitive force. The consequentialist’s doubt of absolute prohibi-
tions is therefore parasitic on belief in it. 
Perhaps, then, it is the nature of moral discourse that we just need certain 
exceptionless norms, and these are to be chosen – nay, discovered – not arbi-
trarily but by our “mystical” perceptions, as refined by practical certainties 
arising from our forms of life. These simply form part of our basic worldview, 
not as conclusions of any arguments but as foundations for intelligibility in 
action and moral discourse.
Proessel writes that a mistake about hinge propositions is to think that they 
are empirical; propositions like the age of the earth certainly have an empirical 
element, but the role they play in providing the background picture against 
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which we do our thinking and play our language-games and live our forms 
of life is a logical one: “certainty shows itself in what we do”, not on the basis of 
facts (2005: 337). So the whole consequentialist attempt to empirically test, 
or falsify absolute prohibitions is a wrong-footed one if we can accept that 
these prohibitions are candidates for Wittgensteinian hinge propositions. Sim-
ilarly wrong-footed would be any notion that agreement, or consensus, is what 
proves the status of hinge propositions (ibid.: 331). One thinks here of the 
role Hume assigns to interpersonal agreement in moral sentiments. Ans-
combean connatural knowledge, I contend, is not justified by this sort of 
consensus – that is not the meaning of “as common as humanity”. Rather, 
agreement takes place through our form of life (ibid.: 332), which is really to 
say, in our language-games. The form of life we share already presents to us 
potential candidates for absolute prohibitions – murder, rape, and theft imme-
diately come to mind. That modern societies not infrequently introduce all 
kinds of exceptions to some of these prohibitions in law can, nonetheless, 
make it difficult to tell to what extent these prohibitions truly need further 
refinement, and whether any of these prohibitions are hinge propositions of 
the sort that are changeable depending on specific cultural or historical factors 
at a particular time.8 
This account does not present a perfect response to the differentiation 
objection, but at the heart of the response is the thought that one need only 
to look at how we live to find work-in-progress answers, which in some ways 
are far more important than the answers of intellectual argumentation. Witt-
genstein writes, almost pre-empting this line of response, “Giving grounds, 
however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; – but the end is not certain 
propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on 
our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game” 
(1969: § 204). This thought, as I have tried to argue, helps to refine our 
understanding of connatural knowledge, which anchors us psychologically 
in the normative practices of our lives and institutions not simply by intuition 
but also by practical certainty. But it also serves to emphasise the primacy of 
acting over intellectual argument in ethics, for ethics is most fundamentally 
a form of practice, a way of thinking embedded in human action qua human 
action. And in this sense, we can never truly banish ethics totally from our 
minds.9
8. Wittgenstein’s conception of hinge propositions does allow for those that are more change-
able than others – perhaps as a result of intellectual conversion, or else because circum-
stances have changed and new empirical evidence, for example, has come to light.
9. I am grateful to Luke Gormally, David Albert Jones, and Anselm Winfried Müller for their 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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